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JUDICIAL ETHICS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
TRACING THE TRENDS
Roger J. Miner*

INTRODUCTION

As the Twenty-First Century begins, public confidence in the
judiciary is on the wane. In a poll sponsored by the American Bar
Association, only thirty-two percent of those responding to questions on
this subject said that they were extremely confident or very confident in
judges.' During a recent argument of an appeal before a panel of which I
was a member, a distinguished law professor, arguing that the district
judge should have recused, said that the public has not much confidence
in judges anyway. We certainly were grateful for his input, which I am
sure greatly advanced his client's cause. But lack of confidence in the
judiciary is surely a serious matter, for the citizenry is well aware that a
properly functioning, impartial, and ethical judiciary is the sine qua non
of a just and democratic society.
It seems clear, however, that at least some of this loss of confidence
derives from factors over which judges have little or no control. These
factors include: inadequate judicial resources; 2 procrastination and
ineffectiveness of counsel; the expense of litigation; restrictions on
judicial discretion, such as sentencing guidelines; 3 and litigants'
*

Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

1. See ABA, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 49 (1999), reprinted in 62 ALB. L.
REv. 1307, 1320 (1999),
2. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, FederalJudges Find Courts Short of Money to Pay Jurors, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A 16 (reporting that the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of
the United States was urging federal trial judges to defer "noncritical" civil trials until October,
when the federal judiciary's new fiscal year begins, due to insufficient funds to pay jurors).
3. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 670 (2003) (changing from
abuse of discretion to de novo the standard of review of district court decisions to depart from the
Federal Sentencing Guildelines); see Ian Urbina, New York Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures,
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unrealistic goals as well as their disappointment with the outcomes of
their litigation. It can also be said that some loss of confidence derives
from the failure of judges to fully exercise their authority when
confronted with such matters as inordinate litigation delays, discovery
abuses, repeated adjournment requests and courtroom misbehavior on
the part of lawyers and litigants. And, of course, there is the loss of
confidence that inevitably flows from individual experiences or media
reports of wrong-headed judgments, illogical decisions, disproportionate
or disparate sentences, and secret court proceedings and settlements. The
major cause of the loss of public confidence in the American judiciary,
however, is the failure of judges to comply with established professional
norms, including rules of conduct specifically prescribed. In brief, it is
the unethical conduct of judges, both on and off the bench, that most
concerns the citizenry and is principally responsible for the crisis in
confidence that the judiciary faces in these early years of this new
millennium.
The trend toward greater public scrutiny of judicial conduct and the
increasing demand for judicial accountability have their roots in this
crisis of confidence. These trends have given rise to the development of
an ever-expanding industry of public and private institutions and
individuals devoted variously to: analyzing the governing rules;
interpreting the rules and suggesting additions and refinements to them;
opining upon individual cases of alleged judicial misconduct; offering
advisory opinions; issuing reports and studies; and, where authorized to
do so, imposing sanctions upon judges for rules violations. Involved in
this judicial conduct industry, on a full-time or part-time basis, are law
professors, journalists, lawyers, citizen court-watchers, judges, and the
members and staffs of judicial conduct commissions and boards, and of
various other institutions, including Congress and state legislatures, that
have, or take, an interest in this area. Their work-your work-is
critically important in assuring an accountable, respected, and impartial
judiciary.
But there is a downside to this industry, and that is overzealousness
in the performance of its work. Too much public scrutiny, too many
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 2003, at B2; see also Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. to Monitor Judges for
Sentences Shorter Than Guidelines Suggest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at A12 (reporting on new

policy adopted by the United States Department of Justice requiring federal prosecutors to "begin
compiling data on [federal trial] judges who give lighter sentences than [the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines] prescribe"); John S. Martin, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at

A31 (op-ed piece written by federal district judge announcing his intent to retire due to PROTECT
Act's restrictions on federal judges' discretion in sentencing).
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rules, too many interpretations of rules, conflicting opinions respecting
specific conduct, picayune concerns, and overregulation impact the
enterprise of judging in a negative way. Ultimately, such excesses can
result in timid judges who continually seek advisory opinions on ethical
matters, recuse when it is unnecessary to do so, and generally look over
their shoulders to see if they are being fitted up by lawyers for some
ethical violation or other. Such activities can be a waste of precious
judicial time and an unnecessary distraction from the judicial business at
hand, and may even have an untoward effect on the decision-making
process itself. These concerns are magnified by unwarranted threats or
unjustified instigations of disciplinary proceedings. The ultimate
consequence of all these concerns could very well be the undermining of
judicial independence.
Under the heading of picayune concerns, I can only refer to the
listing of advisory opinions under the title "Issues for New Judges" in
the Spring 2003 Judicial Conduct Reporter of the American Judicature
Society Center for Judicial Ethics, a leader in the judicial conduct
industry.4 These advisory opinions, some apparently given in response to
specific inquires by judges in different parts of the country to various
organizations that respond to such inquiries, opine upon gifts that new
judges may receive. They say that it is okay to receive a gavel from a
former employer or client, a robe from a bar association, and a reception
from a judge's former law firm. Also in the "okay category" are clocks
and chairs. Now I ask you, should judges be proposing questions of this
nature? Do judges have such an irrational fear of doing the wrong thing
as to worry enough about these matters to seek an opinion? Is there a
real concern that a judge must recuse from all cases involving any
member of a bar association that presented him with a robe?
There was a time when recusal under these circumstances would be
unthinkable. In 1768, Sir William Blackstone wrote: "[I]t is held that
judges or justices cannot be challenged. For the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon
that presumption and idea.",5 Alas, although there is still no written code
of ethics for English judges, the following rule is now applied in the
courts of England: "The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances
which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It

4. See Cynthia Gray, Issuesfor New Judges, JUDICIAL CONDUCT REP., Spring 2003, at 1, 9.
5. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361.
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must then ask whether these circumstances would lead a fair-minded and
informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility,
or a real
6
danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased.",
This test, calling for courts to identify the perception of a fairminded and informed observer, is, as will later be discussed, a recurring
theme in recusal cases as well as in other types of cases implicating
judicial conduct. This should not be a surprising thing, for in modernday society, it is perception, rather than reality, that has the greater
importance. The manipulation or "spinning" of perception has become a
specialized occupation. Law firms consult with such specialists in an
effort to advance public understanding and sympathy for their clients'
causes. It is no wonder that a court was recently constrained to rule on
the extension of the attorney-client privilege to a public relations
consultant retained by counsel on the client's behalf.7 So with the
thought in mind that the overall societal trend is toward the elevation of
perception over reality, I turn to the trends in the rules and norms
governing judicial conduct in six discrete areas: (i) getting to the bench;
(ii) recusal;
(iii) courtroom
behavior;
(iv) off-bench
activity;
(v) financial disclosure; and (vi) competence.
I.

GETTING TO THE BENCH

Although most bar organizations, editorial writers, and other elite
groups seem to favor appointment over election of judges, the great
majority of Americans seem to prefer the election route for getting to the
bench. Seventy-five percent of those polled in a 2002 American Bar
Association survey said that their confidence is greater in judges they
elect than in judges who are appointed.8 Nearly the same proportion saw
cause for concern in campaign fundraising for judges, and almost twothirds of the representative group polled said that they would be more
trusting of judicial candidates unaffiliated with a political party. 9 In other
words, the public seeks an unrealistic purity in the election of judges.
The public seems to be ahead of the ethical curve on electioneering by
judges. Six in ten of those polled said that they saw no problem with the
6. Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading v. Proprietary Ass'n of Gr. Brit., [2001] I.C.R. 564, at 85 (Ct.
App. Civ. Div. 2000).
7. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
8. See Donna Walter, Poll Ranks Public Confidence in Fairness of Judiciary, ST. LOUIS
DAILY REc., Aug. 16, 2002.
9. Id.
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expression of views by judicial candidates and had
no fear that such
0
expressions would be indicative of later partiality.'
The Supreme Court recently brought itself into line with public
thinking on this latter point. In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White," the Court invalidated the so-called "Announce Clause" that was
part of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. 12 That clause,
promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, provided that a candidate
for judicial office could not "announce his or her views on disputed legal
or political issues. ' 3 Seeing First Amendment violations at every turn,
the Federal Supreme Court observed that the Announce Clause was not
narrowly tailored to serve the interests of impartiality and was "woefully
underinclusive" to serve the purpose of "open-mindedness" in the
judiciary.14 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor famously
expressed her distaste for judicial elections, setting forth a parade of
"horribles" that emanate from trusting the people to choose their
judges.' 5 Ironically, she herself was once an elected judge. Justice
Scalia's opinion for the five-to-four majority took special pains to note
what it was not deciding: "[T]he Minnesota Code contains a so-called
'pledges or promises' clause, which separately prohibits judicial
candidates from making 'pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office. . . -a prohibition
that is not challenged here and on which we
16
view."
no
express
A number of states have adopted a "pledges or promises" clause
similar to the one adopted by Minnesota. 7 Such clauses are based on a
1990 amendment to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct designed
to prohibit "statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate
with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court."' 8 In the wake of White, there are sure to be First

10. Id.
11. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
12.
13.
14.

See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i).
Id.
See White, 536 U.S. at 776, 780, 783.

15. Id. at 789-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 770 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)) (citation
omitted).
17. See Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the Solution to Harmful Speech? Judicial
ElectionsAfter Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262, 266-69 (2003).
18. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d) (1990).
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Amendment challenges to these types of provisions.' 9 In a decision
issued just a few days after the White case was handed down, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the campaign phrase "law and order
candidate" was not a violation of the pledges or promises provision of
the New York Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.2 ° On the other hand,
the Florida Supreme Court has found an ethics violation in the campaign
literature of a candidate who claimed the universal endorsement of
police officers, referred to a criminal defendant as a "thug" and a
"punk," and said that she would be supportive of victims.21
Since the extent of permissible regulation of judicial election
campaign speech remains an open question, it is certain that the canons
of judicial ethics in this area will be tested as never before. 22 Court
challenges, as well as proposals for rules changes, are already in
progress.23 There are those who say that only voluntary pledges to
comply with certain standards of campaign conduct will be
permissible.2 4 Regardless of how this all plays out, it now will be
extremely difficult for judicial candidates to win election if they refuse
to announce their positions on the issues of the day. They will be under
intense pressure by the media and by special interest groups to respond
to specific questions, and they cannot now use judicial ethics codes as an
excuse to remain silent. 25 White will also increase pressure upon those
who seek judicial office through appointment to state their views on
subjects that previously were considered taboo. Confirmation hearings
for judicial nominees in the federal system already are taking on a
different aspect as United States Senators insist on the disclosure of

19. Even in White, for example, the controversy continues. See Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 361 F.3d 1035 (D. Minn. 2004) (on remand), vacated and reh g en banc grantedsub noma.
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232 (8th
Cir. May 25, 2004).
20. See In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam).
21. See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 83, 87-90 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam).
22. See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y.),
vacated, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,2004 U.S. LEXIS 4047 (June 7, 2004).
23. See Jeff Blumenthal, PennsylvaniaJusticesAlter JudicialElection Conduct Rules, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 25, 2002; Jordan Rau, Move to Unseat Judge Over Campaign Tests State's
Power, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 2003.
24. See Daniel Wise, Judge Speech Ruling Lacks Effect in State, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 2002, at 1.
25. In the wake of White, the National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial Campaign

Conduct was created. It encourages states to establish their own committees to guide judicial
candidates who are unsure of what may constitute impermissible campaign behavior. See David B.
Rottman, The National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial Campaign Conduct: Mission,
Activities, and Prospects, JUDICIAL CONDUCT REP., Spring 2004, at 1, 4.
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views on a variety of subjects and test the "ideology" of the nominees.26
And although a majority of the population may see a significant
difference between the announcement rule and the pledges and promises
rule, a substantial minority in the poll previously mentioned perceived
that a judicial candidate who announces his or her views will be
committed to those views after taking the bench.27
The financing of judicial elections has also become a topic of great
interest. As previously noted, the public is rightly concerned about
judicial fundraising. In recent years, interest groups have expended
considerable money in pressing for the election of judicial candidates
they think will favor them from the bench.28 Although the public desire
is for restrictions on campaign spending by all who run for office, but
especially by judges, issues of constitutional magnitude present
themselves in this regard. A growing trend seems to be in the direction
of public financing for judicial campaigns. North Carolina recently
adopted a Judicial Campaign Reform Act. 29 It provides for nonpartisan

judicial elections and also for funding for appellate and supreme court
candidates.3 ° Consideration of public funding is also said to be under
way in six other states. 3 1 The public perception is that judges who raise
millions of dollars to get elected to the bench cannot be fair and
impartial when it comes to the interests of their major contributors. The
required isolation of judges from the identities of their contributors is not
always secured.
A disturbing phenomenon in recent times has been the expenditure
of funds to influence the appointive process. These funds, usually raised
26. See Jeffrey Toobin, Advice and Dissent: The Fight Over the President's Judicial
Nominations,NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003, at 46-47.
27. See Walter, supranote 8.
28. Deborah Goldberg et al., The Justice at Stake Campaign, The New Politics of Judicial
Elections (2002), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf. Among
other things, this report noted that: (i) since 1994, campaign expenditures by state Supreme Court
candidates have increased by over 100% and by 61% between 1998 and 2000; (ii) during the period
1999-2000, average spending for 116 judicial candidates was approximately $431,000; and (iii)
during the 2000 election cycle, more than a million dollars was spent on Supreme Court races in
each of nine states, with the highest amounts spent in Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio, where
the hotly contested issue of tort reform drew interest from both plaintiffs' trial lawyers and the

business community. See id.at 7-8.
29. See 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 159A-168A (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.61 to
163-278.70 (2002)).
30. See id.
31. Terry Carter, Footing the Bill for Judicial Campaigns, 1 A.B.A. J. EREP. 40 (Oct. 18,

2002) ("Other states considering public funding of judicial campaigns at the legislative or state bar
level include Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Texas.").
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by special interest groups, are spent on advertisements or mailings to
those involved in the appointment or confirmation of judges in order to
exert influence for or against appointments.32 The trend of judicial rules
of conduct in this area is difficult to predict, but it would seem to be a
good rule for candidates for appointment to steer clear of any association
with the interest groups that provide that type of financing. First
Amendment concerns are implicated here also, and the extent of any
regulation of this type of conduct is problematic.
The participation of judges in elections that are not really elections
at all presents another question involving the ethics of getting to the
bench or remaining there. The situation occurs, for example, when one
political party is so dominant that it cannot be said that there are
contested elections. The party nominee is often chosen by political
leaders for political reasons, including ethnic balancing. In New York
City, where there is an ongoing grand jury investigation into judicial
corruption, allegations of payoffs to political organizations and party
leaders for judicial nominations, which are tantamount to election, have
surfaced.33 Even where direct payoffs are not suspected, political
contributions by judges and their families have given the public a
34
significant negative impression.
In Minnesota, another method has been developed to stymie a true
electoral process. There, it has become the practice for judges to step
down shortly before the end of their elective terms, thereby enabling

32.

See David G. Savage, Fight Gets PoliticalOver Religion, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2003, at 17

(reporting on newspaper ad run by Committee for Justice in Maine and Rhode Island supporting the
nomination of Alabama Attorney General Richard Pryor to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, showing "a courthouse door and includ[ing] the words: 'Catholics need not
apply'); Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, Lobbying Starts as Groups Foresee Vacancy on Court,

N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at Al (reporting that the "Committee for Justice," a group founded by
former White House Counsel to President George H. Bush, C. Boyden Gray, had purchased
"television commercials in some states, supporting those appeals court nominees who have been
blocked by Democratic filibusters").
33. E.g., Daniel Wise, Making a Criminal Case Over Selection of Judges in Brooklyn, N.Y.
L.J., July 23, 2003, at 1.
34. See, e.g., Tom Precious, Judge Scoldedfor Role in Politics, Panel Puts Onus on WhistleBlower, BUFF. NEWS, July 14, 2004, at B I (reporting how a town judge who, in 2002, had "exposed

the pervasive influence of partisan politics in judicial races in Erie County" was "admonished by a
state judicial conduct panel for engaging in the inappropriate political activities that he [had]
complained about"); see also, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, Where Parties Select Judges, Donor List Is a
Court Roll Call, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at Al; Clifford J. Levy, Picking Judges: Party
Machines, Rubber Stamps, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at A1; Mississippi Mud, WALL ST. J., Aug.
13, 2003, at A10.
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gubernatorial appointments of new judges who then run as incumbents.3 5
The appointment process has become so common that ninety-one
percent of the 297 current trial and appellate judges were initially
appointed, and some courts have even gone decades without an open
seat to be filled initially by the voters. 36 As information of this type
comes to the attention of the public, the trend in judicial conduct rules
will be to require judges and judicial candidates to take whatever steps
are necessary to assure their participation only in fair and open judicial
elections. The goal, of course, is the installation of qualified and
competent judges, free of any taint that may imbue by judicial elections
that are merely illusory.
An interesting way to make sure that judges remain in office for
their entire terms is found in the Wisconsin Constitution, as interpreted
by that state's supreme court. That court has concluded that the
Constitution prohibits judges from holding any other public office
during the terms for which they were elected to the bench, even if they
step down from the bench before their elected terms are over.37 Thus, the
will of the people to elect judges is not thwarted by judges.

II. RECUSAL
Nowhere is a standard for judicial conduct so dependent upon
public perception as in the rules governing recusal. Henri de Bracton, in
his thirteenth-century treatise, "The Laws and Customs of England,"
opined: "[T]here is only one reason to recuse-suspicion, which arises
from many causes." 38 Some of the "many causes" for suspicion referred
to by Bracton are now set forth in various statutes and rules governing
judicial conduct.3 9 Yet, it is not the lawyer or the judge whose suspicion
is the standard, according to modern day British law and custom. 4° It is
the judge in England, as well as in the United States, who must measure
the suspicion of the reasonable man to determine whether to recuse. In
present day litigation in this country, lawyers often battle fiercely for

35. Pam Louwagie, Voters in Judicial Elections Just Go Through the Motions, MINNEAPOLISST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Aug. 3, 2003.

36. See id.
37. Mark Hansen, One Job ata Time, 2 A.B.A. J. EREP. 32 (Aug. 15, 2003).
38. JOHN T. NOONAN & KENNETH I. WINSTON, THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE 279 (1993) (quoting
HENRI DE BRACTON, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (1270)).

39. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2000).
40. See Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading v. Proprietary Ass'n of Gr. Brit., [2001] I.C.R. 564 (CA
2000).
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tactical purposes to get judges as well as each other recused from cases.
In many situations of this nature, recusal either has no basis or makes no
sense, and much judicial time is occupied with the issue for naught.
Despite the present practice of Supreme Court Justices in recusing
without providing an explanation, 4 ' the great Chief Justice, John
Marshall, recused in an 1804 case and gave an explanation: He said that
he had "formed a decided opinion on the principal question, while his
interest was concerned., 42 Today, recusal in the federal court system is
governed by statute, and the rules of recusal in state courts generally are
similar to the federal statutory provisions. Disqualification, which I use
interchangeably with recusal, is required of a federal judge who knows
that her or his spouse "has a financial interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
43
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
Financial interest is defined to mean any ownership of a legal or
equitable interest, no matter how small.4 4 And so it has become that a
judge who owns one one-thousandth of one percent of a publicly traded
41. See Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari
Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 659 & n.15 (1996); see, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (merely noting in the syllabus that "Justice Breyer took no part
in the consideration or decision of this case."). Breaking from this tradition of silence, however, in
1993, seven Supreme Court Justices issued a "Statement of Recusal Policy," which provided, in
part, "We do not think it would serve the public interest ... to recuse ourselves, out of an excess of
caution, whenever a relative is a partner in the firm before us or acted as a lawyer at an earlier
stage.... Absent some special factor, therefore, we will not recuse ourselves by reason of a
relative's participation as a lawyer in earlier stages of the case." Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial
Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1217 n.16 (2002). Justice Scalia
cited this policy recently in support of his denial of a motion to recuse that had been filed by one
respondent, the Sierra Club, in a case in which Scalia's good friend and occasional hunting partner,
Vice President Dick Cheney, was a petitioner. Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 1391,
1394 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (mem.). In response to criticism from Congress following Justice Scalia's
decision not to recuse in the Sierra Club case, Chief Justice Rehnquist tasked a committee with
"evaluat[ing] how the federal judicial system is dealing with judicial misbehavior and disability."
Chief Justice Appoints Committee To Evaluate JudicialDiscipline System, THIRD BRANCH, May
2004, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/may04ttb/discipline/index.html; see Rehnquist Orders Study
on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al.
42. Mcllvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 280 (1804). Chief Justice Marshall
was not always consistent, however, as evidenced by his participation in his most famous case,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), notwithstanding the fact that it was Marshall
himself who had failed to deliver Marbury's commission before President Adams' presidential term
had expired. See id at 146; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE

FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 66 n.14 (1985) (citing GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12-13 n.25 (10th ed. 1980)).

43. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
44. See id. § 455(d)(4); see also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d
120, 127 (2d Cir. 2003).
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company that is a party must recuse. Now, recusal seems to be required
in the case of any parent or subsidiary company of a party.4 5 A
"substantial holdings" rule would make more sense, but those who make
the rules are too much concerned about the "suspicion" referred to by
Bracton to allow such a rule. I think that the suspicion of the laity is not
as great as the rulemakers think it is.
The rules governing recusal often list a number of specific
situations and relationships that call for disqualification.46 Also
contained in most rulebooks is a provision similar to the federal recusal
statute that requires "that any... judge ...of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. '47 This type of provision raises several
questions: What circumstances should give rise to a question of
impartiality? When is it reasonable to question impartiality? What tests
should be applied? One can only refer to prior cases and advisory
opinions to formulate an answer to these questions. The Supreme Court
has said that an objective test should be applied, but was not clear, as
usual, as to how this was to be done. 48 I once practiced before a county
judge who recused in a case because one of the witnesses was a man
who pumped gas for him at a local gas station. That, of course, was in
the day when they actually had people who pumped gas. This was the
fear of perception run amok.
The Court has also noted that a judge's "lack of knowledge of a
disqualifying circumstance may bear on the question of remedy, but it
does not eliminate the risk that 'his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned' by other persons." 49 Is there any wonder why judges have
tended to be such "scaredy-cats" when it comes to recusal? Appearance
concerns have also been raised in cases where judges have held small
financial interests in companies that have been victims of crime. °
45. See Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 & advisory committee's note (requiring corporate disclosure
statements in private party's briefs identifying "any parent corporation and any publicly held
corporation that owns 10% or more" of the party's stock because "[a] judge who owns stock in the
parent corporation ...has an interest in litigation involving the subsidiary").
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
47. Id. § 455(a).
48. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); Lileberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861-65 (1988).
49. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 859.
50. Compare United States v. Sellers, 566 F.2d 884, 886-87 (4th Cir. 1977) (no recusal
required), with United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 235-36 (3d Cir. 1982) (recusal required). See
generally Andrew L. Right, Comment, Invested in the Outcome: When the Judge Owns Stock in the
Victim of the Crime, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 481(1998).
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In one case, a mail fraud sentence was vacated by an appellate court
because the trial judge held some shares in a bank that had announced its
intention to merge with the victim bank. 5 1 In another case, a defendant in
a criminal case accused of looting a bank president's estate, sought
recusal of a district judge who was acquainted with the deceased
victim 2 The appellate court observed that there were less than a dozen
personal contacts between the judge and the bank president, and that
there was one letter from the judge to the bank president thanking him
for supporting his nomination and appointment to the federal bench.53
Fortunately, the appellate court determined in that case that recusal was
not necessary.5 4
Recently, the entire bench of a state supreme court recused and was
replaced by judges from the state's court of appeals in connection with a
petition by a member of the state supreme court.55 The petition
apparently was filed by the member to secure a writ of prohibition to
prevent a court of appeals judge from pursuing a judicial ethics
complaint against her for, of all things, misrepresentations made in
campaign literature.56 Why the court did not invoke the Rule of
Necessity, once invoked by the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid recusal
involving judicial compensation,57 is a mystery. By invoking the Rule of
Necessity, the judges of the state supreme court, excepting only the
petitioning judge, could have served. Only recently, an ethics complaint
was filed against a judge who struck down a national rule prohibiting
road building in wilderness areas, the complaint being based on the
judge's extensive interest in the oil and gas industry.58 As the judge
51. See United States v. Feldman, 983 F.2d 144, 144-45 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
52. See United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 663 (4th Cir. 2003).
53. See id. at 666.
54. Id. But see Anthony Lin, Before WorldCom Hearing,Judge Sells All Four AT&T Shares,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 28, 2003 (implying that in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the
bankruptcy judge presiding over the WorldCom bankruptcy sold four shares of stock he owned in
AT&T, which had accused WorldCom of fraudulently dumping calls on AT&T's network).
55. See Gary Young, Ohio Justices-All of Them-Bow Out, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 2003, at 4;
see also In re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1998) (indicating that all Washington Supreme Court
justices recused themselves in a decision reviewing a disciplinary proceeding brought against one of
their colleagues by State's Commission on Judicial Conduct after the justice spoke at an antiabortion rally on the day that he was elected to the court).
56. See Young, supranote 55, at 4.
57. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-17 (1980).
58. See Jennifer S. Lee, Judge Who Ruled on Forests Is Faultedfor Energy Holdings, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2003, at A ll. A pair of so-called "watchdog groups" subsequently brought an ethics
complaint against Judge Brimmer for declining to recuse. Matthew Daly, Judge in Roadless Case
Cleared, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at http://www.kansascity.com/mld/tallahassee/news/
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pointed out, none of the companies included in his financial holdings
was a party to the lawsuit. 59 Here, too, an appearance question was
presented, and perhaps the response was somewhat overdone.
The rules governing judicial conduct that include specific situations
in which recusal is required are clear enough, but there is a large, gray
area presented by the "appearance of evil rule." This has provided great
grist for the mills of the judicial conduct industry, and lawyers and
professors can debate at length questions about when a reasonable
person might, could, or would question a judge's impartiality.60
Questions pertaining to disqualification based on prior positions,
commitments, relationships, and comments will continue to be explored
on a case-by-case basis.6 ' Inconsistency in responses to questions such
as whether and when a judge must recuse when the 62
judge's former
attorney appears in a case will no doubt continue as well.
I make one personal comment on recusal trends. There seems to be
a trend to recuse law clerks or even their judges in cases involving law
firms with which the clerks have interviewed for post-clerkship
positions.63 There is even a stronger move for recusal where the clerk
has been offered or has accepted a post-clerkship position. I think that
such recusal is insulting to the judge and arises from an overblown
perception of the importance of law clerks. 64 Although clerks are very
local/680478I .htm. The Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds. Undeterred, the groups "petition[ed] the judicial
council [of the Tenth Circuit] for review of the chief judge's order[,] ... pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
352(c) and the [circuit's rules governing judicial conduct]." Letter from Douglas T. Kendall,
Executive Director, Community Rights Counsel, and Melanie Sloan, Executive Director, Citizens
for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, to Office of the Circuit Executive, United States
Courts
for
the
Tenth
Circuit
(Oct.
14,
2003),
available at http://www.
communityrights.org/ExposesJudicialLobbying/Conflicts/Brimmer/l0-14-3petition.asp. In a onepage order, the Judicial Council summarily affirmed the Chief Judge's dismissal. See In re Charge
of Judicial Misconduct, No. 2003-10-372-32, slip op. at 1 (10th Cir. Judicial Council Oct. 29, 2003).
59. See id.
60.

See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 9.06,

at 239 (2002).
61.

See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C.

§§ 455 & 144 (2002).
62. See Cynthia Gray, Disqualification: Judge's Attorney Appears in a Case, JUDICIAL
CONDUCT REP., Fall 2002, at 1, 9.
63. See Cynthia Gray, Law Clerk's Future Employer, JUDICIAL CONDUCT REP., Summer

2002, at 1, 9 (noting that a judge may not be "disqualified from cases in which a law clerk's future
employer or prospective future employer represents a party, but under most authority, the judge
should exclude the law clerk from participation in those cases").
64. See, e.g., Linda H. Green, The Spotless Reputation and Federal Law Clerk Employment
Negotiations,25 U. MEM. L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1994).
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valuable to judges, they provide assistance only and are not involved in
the actual decision-making. Recusal rules for them only serve to
reinforce the erroneous perception.
Finally, it appears that the presumption against recusal that came
with the notion of duty to sit has been replaced by the "err on the side of
caution" rule that counsels recusal in an arguable situation.65 I do not
think that this trend is a desirable one, for it will lead inevitably to a
presumption in favor of recusal, with a concomitant burden upon the
judge to rebut the presumption.
III.

COURTROOM BEHAVIOR

When it comes to judicial behavior in the courtroom, the television
icon Judge Judy is a prime example of the rude, sarcastic, arrogant,
intemperate, inconsiderate, short-tempered, and downright nasty judge.
Although she acts in the capacity of a small claims judge or referee who
deals only with litigants directly, in what is essentially a staged setting,
millions applaud her direct way of getting things done. 66 Her popularity
is a paradox, because each member of her television audience would
expect much better courtroom behavior from a judge presiding over a
case in which he or she was a party. Indeed, the trend has been for
disciplinary bodies in appellate courts to identify, criticize, and take
appropriate action in cases of inappropriate courtroom behavior.
Intemperate remarks by appellate judges themselves have been subject
to notice and appropriate sanction.67
Here, too, care must be taken lest the judicial conduct industry get
involved in the micro-management of courtroom behavior. It is only
extreme behavior that should be targeted. When a judge simply rules
against or criticizes counsel, there is no basis for the disqualification
motion that lawyers often make. A judge is entitled to question witnesses
"to clarify both legal and factual issues and thus minimize possible
65. See FREEDMAN, supra note 60, § 9.05, at 238-39 n.73 (quoting Potashnick v. Port City
Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980)).
66. See Judge Judy, Profiles of Justice (2004), at
http://www.judgejudy.com/Bios/allaboutjudy.asp; see also Canoe, $100M Deal Rules Judy a Rich
Woman, TORONTO SUN, Jan. 9, 2003 (reporting Judge Judy's signing a four-year, $100 million
syndication contract and that her show was the "highest-rated court show" on television, often
besting Oprah in the ratings).
67. See, e.g., In re Brown, 691 N.E.2d 573, 574-75 (Mass. 1998) (describing a situation in
which a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court publicly reprimanded a Massachusetts Court of
Appeals Justice for inflammatory statements he made at an oral argument that were critical of the
appellee public employee union, its president, and the president's family).
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confusion in the jurors' minds. 68 The Federal Rules of Evidence
specifically provide that "[t]he court may interrogate witnesses, whether
called by itself or by a party., 69 The familiar rule is that a judge "need
not sit like a 'bump on a log' throughout the trial" and, in a jury trial,
must accept the "active70 responsibility to insure that the issues are clearly
presented to the jury.,
There is a downside for litigants even where judges are acting
within the bounds of propriety. My father once said to a judge who was
examining one of his witnesses: "I don't mind if you question my
witness, but don't lose the case for me." Only questions that imply the
judge's view of the merits are prohibited.7' Such questions unfairly
impose the judge's views upon the jury, especially where they cast doubt
on the credibility of a witness. Without a showing of extra-judicial
antagonism, however, judicial rulings alone cannot form the basis for a
claim of partiality or bias on the part of the judge.72
On the criminal side, a judge who opines at sentencing that a
defendant is a "menace to society" and concludes that an extended term
of imprisonment is warranted by reason of a life devoted to crime, is not
disqualified from presiding over a later retrial.73 However, a judge who
spoke at length at a proceeding following a jury verdict of guilty in a
murder case, accusing the defense of scurrilous allegations, praising the
work of the police, and promising to "restore the reputations" of those
accused of misconduct by the defense, was admonished by a judicial
conduct commission. 74 Appellate judges recognize over-the-top
courtroom conduct when they see it, and have vacated or remanded
judgments in cases where there have occurred such examples of
unfairness as extensive cross-examination of a witness by a judge,
indicating disbelief in his testimony; 75 comments indicating to the jury a
fixed and unfavorable opinion of defendants and their counsel; 76 and
extensive interruption of an opening statement, and frequent suggestions
68. Care Travel Co., Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 944 F.2d 983, 991 (2d Cir. 1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
69. FED. R. EVID. 614(b).
70. United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Vega,
589 F.2d 1147, 1152 (2d Cir. 1978)).
71. See Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1025 (2d Cir. 1991).
72. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
73. See State v. Ortiz, 981 P.2d 1127, 1141 (Haw. 1999).
74. See In re Dillon, 2002 WL 275083, at *3 (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Feb. 6,
2002).

75. See Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
76. See Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter R.R, 81 F.3d 265, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1996).
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that counsel object to witnesses' testimony. 7' In one such case, the
appellate court was constrained to remark that "[t]he comments of the
judge as they appear in the record often would have been questionable
even coming from a prosecuting attorney. ' 78
The trend is to call judges strictly into account for intemperate
conduct in the courtroom. It is clear that cursing in the courtroom,
disrespectful conduct toward litigants, threats of punishment beyond the
power of a judge to impose, and the bullying of counsel are meeting with
zero tolerance. 79 This is all to the good.
Ethical questions for judges are continuing to arise as the result of
the burgeoning volume of pro se litigation. The courtroom behavior of
judges toward pro se litigants presents a special dilemma where the
opposing party is represented by counsel. Although a judge is always
barred from acting as an attorney for a pro se litigant, there may be some
duty to level the playing field to avoid a miscarriage of justice at trial.8 °
There are great risks to the appearance of justice when a judge assists a
pro se litigant to make a case. Opposing counsel and the opposing party
may think that the judge is showing undue preference. On the other
hand, the pro se party will be angered if he loses his case and may think
the judge "threw him in." Boundaries certainly should be established for
judicial participation, for judges need to be able to point to fixed rules to
get them off the hook that impales them in pro se litigation cases.
Affirmative obligations already have been imposed upon administrative
law judges in the social security and immigration contexts to fully
develop the administrative record where parties are unrepresented by
counsel.8 1 Can the imposition of such obligations upon courts be far
behind?
In recent years, there has been a trend not only to assist but to
encourage pro se litigation. As a result, the volume of pro se litigation

77. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 805-08 (6th Cir.
1999).
78. Killilea v. United States, 287 F.2d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 1961).
79. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 566 S.E.2d 310, 311-15 (Ga. 2002); In re
Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. 2000); In re Ochoa, 51 P.3d 605, 606-07 (Or. 2002); In re
Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 926 (Wash. 1999); In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Michelson, 591 N.W.2d 843, 844-46 (Wis. 1999).
80. See Russell Engler, And Justicefor All-Including The UnderrepresentedPoor: Revisiting
the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2013 (1999).

81. See Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 732-33 (9th Cir. 2000); Lashley v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1983); Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399, 404 (5th
Cir. 1981).
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has been increasing in the courts of the nation.82 Some courts have
established booths in the courthouse where pro se litigants can come for
assistance in starting their lawsuits, and others provide assistance all
along the line as the suit progresses.83 The American Judicature Society,
which has developed a reputation as a leading national resource on pro
se litigation, has generated several publications analyzing methods for
helping pro se litigants.8 4 Whether undertaken by court clerks and
administrative personnel or judges themselves, the practice of law by a
court in this manner undermines the traditional notion of an adversarial
system that includes an impartial interlocutor as an essential component.
Moreover, a pro se litigant whose case is dismissed after she follows the
course set by the court will have a skewed view of the judicial process.
The great majority of pro se litigants are pro se because they are
poor and cannot afford lawyers.85 My own solution to stem the rising
tide of pro se litigation is to require lawyers to represent these indigent
people without charge. There are a great many lawyers practicing today,
and each one could yield some of his or her time to assist a few indigent
clients in simple cases each year. This suggestions harks back to an
earlier day, when I, and others like me, were ordered by the courts or
asked by the bar association to represent indigents in criminal or civil
cases without charge. I was told that this was an obligation that went
with admission to the bar. The concept that this is involuntary servitude
in violation of the Constitution is pure hogwash.86 The representation of

82. See Jona Goldschmidt, How are the Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants?, JUDICATURE,
July-Aug. 1998, at 13, 14 (reporting that: (1) a study by the Federal Judicial Center of ten federal
district courts found that, between 1991 and 1994, non-prisoner pro se cases constituted thirty-seven
percent of all cases filed; and (2) data from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
showed that the number of pro se litigants in federal appeals courts increased by forty-nine percent
between 1991 and 1993).
83. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEN. DIST. OF N.Y., PRO SE HANDBOOK: THE MANUAL
FOR THE LITIGANT FILING A LAWSUIT WITHOUT COUNSEL (1997-98); see also John M. Stanoch,
Working With Pro Se Litigants: The MinnesotaExperience, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297, 300-01
(1998); Edward M. Holt, Comment, How to Treat "Fools": Exploring the Duties Owed to Pro Se
Litigants in Civil Cases, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 167, 171-72 (2001).
84. See, e.g., JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, MEETING THE
CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT
MANAGERS (1998); BETH M. HENSCHEN, LESSONS FROM THE COUNTRY: SERVING SELFREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN RURAL JURISDICTIONS (2002). See generally Am. Judicature Soc'y,
Pro Se Forum, Publications and Resources, at http://www.ajs.org/prose/proresources.asp (last
visited Aug. 25, 2004).
85. See Engler, supra note 80, at 1987-89.
86. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Constitution of Equal Citizenship for a Good Society, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1812 (2001) (noting that "[a] well-established line of precedent holds that
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pro se litigants without charge is an ethical obligation and should be a
legal requirement for lawyers to fulfill. Otherwise, the judicial ethical
dilemma will continue as pro se litigation grows ever more voluminous,
with litigants looking to courts for guidance rather than impartiality.
A majority of the cases resulting in the removal of judges from the
bench during the last decade has involved conduct related to the exercise
of judicial power. 87 Other than misconduct in the courtroom, these cases
have concerned such matters as wrongful issuance of arrest warrants,
failure to remit court funds, neglect of administrative duties, abuse of the
contempt power, refusal to set appeals bonds, ex parte communications,
improper issuance of a temporary restraining order, and dismissal of
criminal charges in willful disregard of the law and without notice to
prosecutors. 88 There are also the cases of the outright abuse of judicial
power through criminal conduct such as sexual harassment, theft,
acceptance of bribes, and the like. 89 But whether criminal or not, the
abuse of judicial power is judicial misconduct of the most evil kind, for
it undermines the very foundations of the judicial system. As in the past,
misconduct in the performance of a judge's duties, or in the exercise of
his or her powers, will justly bring forth the greatest condemnation and
sanctions.
IV.

OFF-BENCH ACTIVITY

Although off-bench misconduct has not given rise to as many
disciplinary proceedings and sanctions as has misconduct in the
courtroom and in the exercise of judicial power,90 it has become an area
of increasing concern. Certain trends are apparent in the approaches to
such off-bench conduct as discussion of specific cases, maintenance of
memberships in various organizations, participation in social and
charitable activities, acceptance of trips to educational seminars funded
by private interest groups, and involvement in the political activities of a
non-judicial spouse.

constitutional prohibitions of involuntary servitude extend only to physical restraints or legal
confinement, which are not sanctions authorized by mandatory pro bono programs").
87. See CYNTHIA GRAY, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 8 (2002)
(stating that sixty-nine out of 110 removal cases "involved misconduct entirely or substantially
related to a judge's duties or power").
88. Seeid. at8-17.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 20-23.
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With regard to comments by judges about specific cases, the Code
of Conduct for United States Judges is typical. It simply proscribes
"public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action" except
where made in the course of official duties, to explain court procedures
or as a scholarly presentation made for purposes of legal education. 9 1
The 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is slightly different, as
it prohibits public comment on a proceeding pending or impending "in
any court" where the comment "might reasonably be expected to affect
its outcome or impair its fairness.' 92 A First Amendment challenge to
the public comment provision of the New Jersey Canons of Judicial
Ethics was rejected in the case of a judge who acted as a television
commentator on various high-profile cases. 93 The pertinent New Jersey
Canon had incorporated the "any court" provision of the ABA Model
Code.94
The principal thrust of public comment canons has been against
comments by judges in cases pending before them. In a celebrated case
of recent vintage, the appellate court remanded for retrial, before a
different judge altogether, because the trial judge had granted secret
interviews to the press during the course of the trial, the interviews
having been granted on condition that they would not be released until
final judgment had been entered.95 The rule against public comment on
impending cases has been somewhat more difficult to apply, since it
deals with expectations. The belief that a case may be filed is sufficient
to trigger the rule.96 Comment on the great public issues of the day
would seem to be enjoined, 97 because many such issues invariably end
up in the courtroom after they have been mashed up by the executive
and legislative branches of government.

91.
92.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(6) (1999).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9) (1990).

93. See In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543 (N.J. 1996). But see, e.g., Griffen v. Ark. Jud.
.Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 130 S.W.3d 524, 538 (holding that the commission's
admonishment of Judge Griffen, pursuant to Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4(c)(1), for
his addressing the Arkansas Legislative Black Caucus on the firing of Arkansas University head
basketball coach Nolan Richardson violated the First Amendment because the canon was "vague
and indefinite and [was] not narrowly tailored so as to avoid an infringement on free speech").
94. See In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at 545.
95. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
96. See CYNTHIA GRAY, COMMENTING ON PENDING CASES 13-14 (2001).
Oct. 15, 2003, at 4
97. See, e.g., Supreme Court to Hear Pledge ofAllegiance Case, N.Y. L.J.,
(noting Justice Scalia's recusal, "depriving pledge supporters of a near-certain vote," based on a
speech in which Scalia "suggested that the words 'under God' could be excised from the pledge
only through legislative action by Congress").
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In any event, unless First Amendment jurisprudence eventually
dictates otherwise, the rule that squelches all judicial comment on
pending cases will continue to be enforced. Here again, the basis for the
rule is the need to guard against the public perception of impartiality and
bias. But questions needing resolution will arise over what is impending,
what is encompassed by the exception allowing for explanation of
courtroom procedures, and what comment is allowed for judges through
teaching and scholarly writing. 98 I would hope that I am not in violation
when I lecture my law students about the wrong-headed Supreme Court
reversals of my decisions. Courts and disciplinary authorities will
continue to have little difficulty in dealing with judges who have used
the media to publicly criticize appellate court decisions that have
remanded their judgments for further proceedings, to respond to
criticism in a pending case or to comment on a case pending before
another judge.
Most codes of judicial conduct, including the Code of Conduct for
Federal Judges, follow the ABA Model Code provision prohibiting
"membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin." 99 Several states
have added sexual orientation to the list of invidious discrimination
bases. 00 One of those states, California, has exempted non-profit youth
organizations from the list. As a result of that exemption, judges there
may participate in the Boy Scouts, which discriminates against
homosexuals.' 0
Recently, the California Supreme Court declined to withdraw the
exemption, but added a commentary to the Code as follows: "[A] judge
should disclose to the parties his or her membership in an organization,
in any proceeding in which the judge believes the parties or their lawyers
might consider this information relevant to the question of
disqualification, even if the judge concludes there is no actual basis for

98. See GRAY, supra note 96 at 6-8, 13-16.
99. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (1990); see CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2(C) (1999).
100. See, CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2(C) (2003); MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (2003); N.Y. JUDICIAL STANDARDS & ADMIN. POLICIES § 100.2(D) (2003);
OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1-101(H) (2002); VT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon

2(C) (2003).
101.

See Mike McKee, Judges Told to Reveal Club Memberships, LEGAL TIMES, June 23,

2003, at 14.
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disqualification.' 02 As noted by some commentators, this is a
problematic provision, for it permits judges to be disqualified even
where membership in the specific organization is permitted.' °3 The
rationale is stated in the first sentence of the added commentary:
"[M]embership in certain organizations may have the potential to give
an appearance of partiality, although membership in the organization
generally may not be barred."' 0 4 The trend has been to tweak these
"invidious discrimination" provisions in an effort to avoid constitutional
problems. For example, the new Code of Judicial Conduct promulgated
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court includes the following:
"As long as membership does not violate any other provision of this
Code, nothing in this Section bars membership in any official United
States military organization, in any religious organization, or in any
organization that is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private
organization."' 10 5 This type of specificity should be helpful, because, as
the ABA commentary points out, the question of invidious
discrimination is a complex one, and
depends on how the organization selects members and other relevant
factors, such as that the organization is dedicated to the preservation of
religious, ethnic or cultural values of a legitimate common interest to
its members, or that it is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private
organization whose membership
limitations could not be
06
constitutionally prohibited. 1
Fortunately, Cynthia Gray and the American Judicature Society have
provided an excellent paper summarizing and analyzing the various
invidious discrimination canons. 107 The trend toward specificity has been
greatly assisted by this paper, which is very useful as a guide for judges.
As to the participation of judges in social and charitable events, the
trend has been toward rather strict enforcement of the rule against
participation in fundraising events, even though conducted by and for
worthy charities. The reason for the prohibition is clear: The prestige of
the judicial office may not be used for the solicitation of funds or for

102. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3(E) advisory committee cmt. (2004) (emphasis
added).
103. See McKee, supra note 101, at 14.
104. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3(E) advisory committee cmt. (2004).
105. MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (2003).
106. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (1990) (commentary).
107. See CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, ORGANIZATIONS THAT PRACTICE
INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION (1996).
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other fundraising activities.'" 8 This is not to say that judges cannot be
involved in charitable organizations. Judges are permitted to participate
in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations not
conducted for profit. 10 9 Judges must take care, however,
to avoid
0
involvement with organizations that are frequent litigants. "
In regard to fundraising, it is of course a matter of great concern
that those solicited may feel compelled to contribute or hold the
expectation that they may somehow benefit from contributing to a
charity in which the judge is interested. However, as an author has
noted: "[I]t is certainly accurate to say that lawyers or court personnel
can be intimidated into contribution by the solicitation of sitting judges,
[but] it seems less likely that average citizens would feel equally
compelled, particularly where the format of the solicitation is relatively
anonymous.'' 1 The rule nevertheless is strictly enforced. A judge of my
acquaintance was censured some years ago for participating in a "Jail
Bail for Heart" charitable fund-raiser, 2 even though he did not
personally solicit funds."l 3 Any advertised appearance of a judge at a
fundraising event violates the rule, as does the imprint of a judge's name
4
and judicial title on a fundraising solicitation letter." 1
As to social events, judges have been allowed to accept ordinary
social hospitality, but are constrained to avoid events that carry the
appearance of partiality."15 The Canons of Ethics encourage judges to
participate in the activities of bar associations and other groups
dedicated to the improvement of justice, and the judge and spouse may
attend bar functions, such as dinners and retreats, as guests of bar

108.

JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 9.06, at 295 (3d ed.

2000).
109.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(C)(3) (1990).

110. See id. at Canon 4(C)(3)(a).
111. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 108, § 9.06, at 295 (footnote omitted).
112.

See In re Harris, 529 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1988) (per curiam) (explaining that the "Jail Bail

for Heart was a scheme in which mock criminal charges were prepared and served on the fund drive
solicitors." The sheriff brought the solicitors into the courthouse to appear in front of the judge.
They were then "prosecuted" by the District Attorney and "fined" in the amount they had raised.).
113. See id.

114. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(C)(3)(b) (1990) (commentary); see
also CYNTHIA GRAY, A JUDGE'S ATTENDANCE AT SOCIAL EVENTS, BAR ASSOCIATION FUNCTIONS,
CIVIC AND CHARITABLE FUNCTIONS, AND POLITICAL GATHERINGS (1996); SHAMAN, supra note

108, §§ 9.07, 9.09.
115. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(D)(5) (1990); CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 5(A) (1999).
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groups. 1 6 The trend has been to encourage judges, within ethical
constraints, to speak, write, lecture, and teach about the law and the legal
system. 1 7 I have long held the view that judges have a positive duty to
educate and that the duty extends to the education of law students as
well as of the practicing bar. Judges in the federal system may receive
payment, up to certain limits based on their salaries, for teaching,
although honoraria are disallowed."i 8
Many bar associations take positions on matters of social policy.
The American Bar Association has taken a number of positions on social
policy, as has the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, just to
give two examples. The trend is for judges to maintain their
memberships in such associations, but to avoid participation in the
development of controversial public policy positions and to avoid voting
upon them as well. 1 9 Some judges apparently feel so uneasy about this
phase of bar association activity that they have resigned from
membership rather than be associated in any way with policies with
which they do not agree or which they feel may be tested in their courts.
A hot issue for federal judges has been the propriety of attendance
at all-expense-paid seminars sponsored by private interest groups. At
least one application for recusal on the basis of a judge's attendance at
such a seminar was rejected. 120 Recently, congressional legislation to
prohibit such attendance has been attached to proposals for pay raises for
federal judges. 121 Despite the support of the Chief Justice and the
Judicial Conference of the United States for such programs, 22 adverse
publicity about the appearance of partiality will tend to hold down
judicial participation in such privately financed activities. At least that is
the way I see it. It does seem strange, though, that no questions have
116. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4(C) (1999); see also In
re Petition of Wiley, 671 A.2d 308, 309-10 (R.I. 1996).
117. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(B) (1990).
118. See REGULATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER TITLE
VI OF THE ETHICS REFORM ACT OF 1989 CONCERNING OUTSIDE EARNED INCOME, HONORARIA,
AND OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT ("JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OUTSIDE INCOME REGULATIONS") §§
3(b)(7), 4 (2000).
119. See James G. Glazebrook, Judicial Impartiality and the Advocacy of Social Policy, FED.
TRIAL NEWS, Spring 2002, at 31, 33.
120. SeeIn re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 195-96 (2d Cir. 2001).
h
121. See Fair and Independent Federal Judiciary Act of 2003, S. 787, 1081 Cong. (2003)
(providing for the fair treatment of the Federal Judiciary relating to compensation and benefits); see
also Link Increase in Pay to JudicialJunket Ban, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS NEWS, June 2, 2003, at

6B.
122.

See Tony Mauro, Judge Junkets Inquiry Pits A.B.A. v. Bench, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 2002, at
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been raised about judges who accept all-expense-paid trips from
specialty bar associations, such as the one based in New York City, that
regularly fly judges and their spouses to high-end resorts in such places
as Hawaii and Mexico under cover of participation in brief panel
discussions.
Inevitably, First Amendment challenges to restrictions on the
political activities of sitting judges not campaigning for their own
elections will be mounted in the wake of Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White. 123 Just as inevitably, the rules governing the extent to which a
judge may be involved in the political activities of a spouse will be
subject to First Amendment testing. Present rules generally prohibit
124
judges from any direct participation in a spouse's political campaign.
This includes such things as soliciting funds, handing out campaign
literature, posting signs, soliciting votes, accompanying the spouse to
campaign events, or driving a car with a spouse's campaign sticker
25
attached. 1

Some of the rules regarding participation in spousal candidacies are
downright silly. For example, it appears that New York prohibits a judge
from contributing to a spouse's political campaign. 126 There are
conflicting opinions about whether funds from a joint bank account can
127
be withdrawn by a judge's spouse to be used for political purposes.
Questions have even been raised about a judge's attendance at nonpolitical events with a candidate spouse, whether a judge's photograph
may be included in a campaign brochure, and the permissible uses of a
28
jointly owned house during a spouse's campaign.'
While it is true that a spouse's political activities may be perceived
as reflecting the judge's views, care must be taken so as not to impede
the political career of a spouse through the overregulation of a judge.
The rights of a spouse may be affected through the application of rules
of judicial ethics. When I first became a judge, I acquainted my wife
with the then-applicable 1972 ABA Model Code, which provided that a
judge "should encourage members of his [note the archaic "his"] family

123.
124.

See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
See CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY MEMBERS OF A
JUDGE'S FAMILY 3 (1996).

125. See id.
at 3-5
126. See N.Y. Judicial Ethics Adv. Op. No. 92-129, 1993 WL 838925 (Jan. 28, 1993).
127. Compare Me. Judicial Ethics Adv. Op. No. 94-3 (prohibiting use of funds), with Fla.
Judicial Ethics Adv. Op. No. 87-22 (1997) (permitting use of funds).
128. See GRAY, supranote 124, at 4-6.
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to adhere to the same standards of political conduct that apply to him. 129
My wife, a well-known political activist at that time, responded:
"Consider me encouraged," and went on to lead some statewide and
national campaigns. The encouragement to adhere to judicial conduct
rules now 0 applies only in regard to the judge's own political
campaign.13

V.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

A spouse of a judge may also become involved in issues of judicial
ethics through the requirement that judges file financial disclosure
statements. Such requirements exist in almost every state and in the
federal system. 131 Designed primarily to reveal conflicts of interest, the
financial statements required are often so detailed and the forms for
disclosure so cryptic that many judges retain the services of certified
public accountants to prepare the reports. Indeed, federal judges are
allowed reimbursements of up to $1,000 for such fees. 132 In any event, a
federal judge is required to disclose financial information concerning his
or her spouse and dependent children as well as his or her own financial
information.' 33 Exempt from disclosure are assets in which the spouse
has a sole financial interest, and (1) which are not derived from the
assets or income of the judge; (2) from which the judge does not derive
134
or expect any benefit; and (3) of which the judge has no knowledge.
Compliance with the last prong of the exemption provision is almost
impossible. A similar rule applies to the reporting of liabilities.' 35 Earned
income and honoraria received by a spouse must also be reported. So
must gifts to the spouse, including transportation, lodging, food, and
entertainment. These items must be reported in the same manner in
which the judge must report them, except when the spouse receives such
36
gifts totally independent of the judge.
While no substantial changes in the rules pertaining to financial
disclosure are on the horizon, there is a public perception that it is

129.
130.
131.
132.
II, pt. C,
133.
134.
135.
136.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(a) (1972).
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3) (1990).
SHAMAN, supra note 108, § 8.01, at 259.
See I1-A ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDGES MANUAL ch.
§ 7 & Exh. C-3 (2002).
5 U.S.C. app. § 102(e)(1)(A)(B).
See id. § 102(e)(1)(E).
See id.§ 102(a)(4).
See id. § 102(e)(1)(A).
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important to know the financial activities of judges. However, at least
one commentator has objected to the federal disclosure rule provision
that judges be notified when an application for a copy of a financial
report has been fulfilled. 37 The objection is grounded in the belief that
the provision tends "to chill public access" in the case of lawyers or
litigants who would prefer to access this information anonymously.' 38 I
see little validity in this argument and do not know of any lawyer or
litigant who has been "chilled" by this requirement. One thing the notice
provision has demonstrated to me, however, is that access is requested in
the most part by newspapers and other media organizations strictly for
gossipy purposes.
The Judicial Conference of the United States recently addressed the
question of public access to financial disclosure reports by issuing
detailed regulations pertaining to the release of the reports. 139 The
regulations recognize the security concerns that some judges have, and
provide that notice must be given to the judge prior to release.140 They
provide that any financial disclosure report that may be publicly
disseminated after release may be redacted "to prevent public disclosure
of personal or sensitive information that could endanger the filer
directly, or indirectly by endangering another, if possessed by a member
of the public hostile to the filer."' 4 1 Reasons for the redaction sought
must be given, and the Committee on Financial Disclosure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States is empowered to decide
42
questions of redaction after consultation with the Marshal's Service.
In these times of heightened security consciousness, state as well as
federal authorities will be confronted with the need to balance the
people's right to know against the need to redact or withhold financial
disclosure information for the protection of judges from specific and
identifiable threats.
VI.

COMPETENCE

Codes of judicial conduct invariably require judges to be
competent. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is typical. It
states: "A judge should be faithful to and maintain professional
137.
138.
139.
140.

See SHAMAN ETAL., supranote 108, § 8.15, at 279.
Id.
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS, supra note 118.
Id. § 5.2.

141.
142.

Id. § 5.2(d).
See id.
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competence in the law." 143 Competence has various components,
including intellectual capacity, knowledge of the law, good judgment,
understanding of the judicial process and of the role of the judge, and
diligence. The requirement for judicial diligence is often separately
stated in judicial ethics codes in such phrases as: "A judge should
dispose promptly of the business of the court." 144 If there is any trend in
this area, it is in the direction of greater expectations of judicial
competence by a citizenry that is becoming increasingly knowledgeable
about the functioning of the legal system. This trend will lead to
demands for greater efforts to enforce competence requirements.
Probably the greatest source of frustration for lawyers and litigants
is the failure of judges to deliver decisions in a timely manner. This
frustration is all the greater because of the fear that even a request to
expedite a decision will incur the judge's wrath and produce an
undesirable result. While the heavy workloads of many judges may
cause inevitable delays in the issuance of opinions, it is often necessary
for a judge to prioritize in order for time-sensitive cases to receive early
attention.145 A few years ago, criminal case overload was so great in one
United States District Court that it was necessary to place a temporary
hold on civil cases until the criminal backlog was reduced. Dilatoriness
and inefficiency, however, can never be countenanced. 146 With respect
to case processing, time standards, and reporting requirements have been
established in a number of states, as well as in the federal system. 147 The
consequences of failure to comply with these standards and requirements
range from peer pressure to suspension. 48 When I first became a Circuit
Judge, there was an ongoing discussion about what to do with a district
judge who was far behind in his work. A senior judge suggested that
some of the district judge's cases be taken away until the backlog was
disposed of. I thought that this was a very curious punishment, but the
senior judge said that he could think of no greater insult. In the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, it is said to

143.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(1) (1999).

144. Id. Canon 3(A)(5).
145. See SHAMAN, supra note 108, § 6.06, at 193-94.
146. See id. § 6.05, at 187-92 (describing examples of judicial decisions in response to court
backlogs in various jurisdictions).
147. See generally id.; 111-A ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
JUDGES MANUAL eh. IV, pt. A, § 2 (1999).
148. See SHAMAN, supranote 108, § 6.05, at 187-92.
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be the custom to withhold opinion-writing
assignments from judges who
14 9
are not current in their work.
Competence requires that judges see to the competence and
diligence of their staffs and those under the judge's administrative
control. 50 It also requires that judges keep abreast of new statutes, new
Supreme Court precedent, and recent developments in the law of the
jurisdiction in which he or she serves. More importantly, competence
requires familiarity with procedural as well as substantive law. Lawyers
seem to be skeptical about the competence of judges in regard to legal
knowledge, and often start their arguments with explanations of basic
law. Apparently, they begin with the assumption that judges know little
or nothing, an assumption probably instilled in them by law professors. I
once stopped an attorney who started his argument by ticking off the
elements of a contract. I said: "You may proceed to concepts of
intermediate difficulty and assume that we know the basics." On this
point, I am put in mind of the barrister who argued before the Court of
Appeal in London. One of the judges said to the barrister: "I have been
listening to you now for four hours and I am bound to say that I am none
the wiser." The barrister replied: "Oh, I know that, my Lord, but I had
hoped you would be better informed." 5 1
Knowledge of the law and diligence in its application to the facts of
the case are not too much to ask of judges. Judges are sometimes wrong
on the law, but that is why appellate courts exist. However, their
decisions should reflect their personal attention and involvement in the
case, and the decisions should be their own. The question recently has
arisen as to whether a judge's decision is his own in a situation where an
appellate opinion repeated verbatim large chunks of the brief of one of
the parties.1 52 As is frequently the case, academic opinion within the
149. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effect of Collegialityon JudicialDecision Making, 151 U. PA.

L. REV. 1639, 1665 (2003); see also Cynthia Gray, Recent Cases: Delay in CirculatingOpinions by
Supreme Court Justice, JUDICIAL CONDUCT REP., Winter 2001, at 7, 8. As part of a conditional
settlement offer, the Wyoming Commission on Judicial Conduct submitted to the Governor and
Chief Justice of Wyoming a letter of resignation from a Wyoming Supreme Court Justice. The
resignation was required after the Commission determined that he was not circulating opinions. Id.
150. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(2) (1999); see also In re
Groneman, 38 P.3d 735, 736-38 (Kan. 2002) (holding that public censure for a judge who allowed
an administrative assistant to work at a second job at times that conflicted with her duties and signed
false time sheets).
151. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the UnitedStates Supreme Court, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
1,11 (1951).
152. See Siobhan Morrissey. A Case of Judicial Plagiarism?,2 A.B.A. J. EREP. 30 (Aug. 1,
2003) (reporting that dissatisfied tobacco plaintiffs' attorneys request for en bane review of Florida
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judicial conduct industry is divided on this
question. Some see no harm
1 53
in the practice; others see it as plagiarism.
In my practice days, I considered it a good thing if a judge lifted
some of my language from a brief. Wholesale lifting probably is
questionable. A colleague on the state court during my state trial judge
days had two rubber stamps-one with the imprint "found" and the other
with the imprint "not found." He would ask for enumerated findings of
fact and conclusions of law from both sides and would use one stamp or
the other in the margin of each item. Appellate courts generally have
disapproved of this practice. 5 4 Nevertheless, courts generally have been
reluctant to reverse for the verbatim adoption of prepared findings,
especially where the judge has revised them in certain respects and
thereby has demonstrated his or her own input in the decision.1 55
It seems to me that the duty of competence includes the duty to
assist in the selection of those who will serve as competent judges.
Typically, ethics codes allow judges to "participate in the process of
judicial selection by cooperating with appointing authorities and
screening committees seeking names for consideration, and by
responding to official inquiries concerning a person being considered for
a judgeship."' 56 1 see this as an affirmative duty, although it is ordinarily
not so framed. Close attention should be paid to the opinions of sitting
judges as to who is competent to join them. Judicial competence is too
important to be left to committees of lawyers alone to determine. In this
regard I quote from the records of the Constitutional Convention as they
reflect the tongue-in-cheek remarks of Benjamin Franklin during the
debate on the issue of the proper method of judicial selection: "He then
in a brief and entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which the
nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest
of the profession in 157
order to get rid of him, and share his practice
(among themselves)."

Third District Court of Appeal decision, on the ground that 86% of the panel's opinion was lifted
verbatim out of appellees' briefs).
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985); Counihan v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 363 (2d Cir. 1999); Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 47,
53 (2d Cir. 1991).
155. See, e.g., Counihan, 194 F.3d at 363.
156. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2(B) cmt. (1999).
157. Roger J. Miner, Advice and Consent in Theory and Practice, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1075,
1076 (1992) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 119-20 (Max.
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
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CONCLUSION

I conclude with an observation and a suggestion. My observation is
that judicial malefactors constitute but a very small percentage of the
American Judiciary at any given time. There are more than 30,000 full
and part-time judges in the nation.1 58 In the twenty-one-year period
between 1980 and the end of 2001, only about 285 were removed from
office through state disciplinary proceedings.' 59 It is true that some
judges during that period resigned, retired, were defeated or did not run60
for reelection, or died before complaints against them were resolved;
and that disciplinary sanctions other than removal were imposed in a
number of cases. Nonetheless, it was the very rare case in which an
ethical violation was of sufficient magnitude to warrant removal.
Although one ethical violation is too many, regardless of the
penalty imposed, the ethical condition of the judiciary is not as much in
need of repair as the judicial conduct industry sometimes makes it out to
be. I referred earlier to the possible effects upon judges of the
overzealousness of the industry in the performance of its work. The
same excessive zeal may also affect the citizenry by contributing to an
unwarranted lack of confidence in the judiciary as a whole. The industry
should be attentive to this concern.
My suggestion is for greater transparency in judicial disciplinary
proceedings. Unsurprisingly, the press has been clamoring for this for
some time, 16 1 and I, for one, think it would be a good thing. So do other
judges. 62 Secrecy is usually not desirable in matters of this kind, and I
believe that open proceedings would go far toward restoring public
confidence in the judiciary. Various reasons have been advanced for
keeping judicial disciplinary proceedings closed. They include:
(1) shielding complainants and witnesses from retribution and
harassment; (2) protecting innocent judges from being wrongly accused;
(3) maintaining confidence in the judicial system by avoiding premature
disclosures of misconduct; (4) encouraging offending judges to resign in

158. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FY 2003 STATISTICAL REPORT FOR JUSTICES
AND JUDGES OF THE U.S., available at http://web.ao.dcn/ciris/fy03statisticalreport.pdf; NAT'L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002, at 11, available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2002_Files/2002_MainPage.html.
159. See Nine Judges Removed in 2002, JUDICIAL CONDUCT REP., Winter 2003, at 1.
160. See GRAY, supra note 87, at 7.
161. See, e.g., A Fine Fix Fora Broken Bench, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 2003, at 30.
162. See, e.g., ChiefJudge Urges Open Hearings,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,2003, at B2.
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place of a formal hearing; and (5) insulating
Judicial Conduct
63
pressures.1
outside
from
members
Commission
My rebuttal to these arguments includes the following:
(1) witnesses in these proceedings need no more protection from
retaliation and harassment than they need in any other type of judicial
proceeding; (2) many wrongly accused judges would like it to be known
publicly that the accusations against them are baseless; (3) public
confidence in the system is enhanced when the public can follow the
accusation, the proceedings employed to resolve it, and the ultimate
disposition; (4) offending judges should not be permitted to have the
accusations disposed of merely by resigning; and (5) there is no
demonstrable need to protect carefully-chosen commission members
from "outside pressure." Indeed, it is interesting to note that some judges
1 64
in closed-hearing states have demanded that their hearings be open.
According to recent dispatches, the New York Judicial Conduct
Commission received 1,435 complaints about judges in the year 2002. 165
There are nearly 3,500 full and part-time judges in New York. 166 Only
twenty-eight judges received public discipline of any kind. 167 If all of
these complaints had all been made public, it would have been clear to
the citizenry that the vast majority of complaints about judges were
made by litigants who simply were unhappy with the outcomes of their
cases. It would also have been clear that the vast majority of judges
conform to the highest ethical standards in their judicial service. And it
would have been clear that the judiciary as a whole well deserves the
confidence of the public it serves.

163. See Bob Bernick Jr., JudiciaryDiscipline Called Overly Secret, DESERT NEWS, Nov. 12,
2002, at Al.
164. See A Judge On Trial, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Aug. 2, 2003, at A6.
165. See Cerisse Anderson, Commission on Judicial Conduct Reports 28 Judges Publicly
DisciplinedLast Year, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 4, 2003, at 1.
166. See Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Conduct, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial
Conduct, in 54 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 586,611 n. 116 (1999).
167. See Anderson, supra note 165, at 1.
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